1	BEFORE THE
2	FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	x
5	IN THE MATTER OF: :
6	CONSENT MARKETS, TARIFFS AND RATES - ELECTRIC:
7	CONSENT MARKETS, TARIFFS AND RATES - GAS :
8	CONSENT ENERGY PROJECTS - HYDRO :
9	CONSENT ENERGY PROJECTS - CERTIFICATES :
10	DISCUSSION ITEMS :
11	STRICKEN ITEMS :
12	X
13	
14	COMMISSION MEETING - 790TH REGULAR MEETING
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16	Hearing Room 2 C
17	Federal Energy Regulatory
18	Commission
19	888 First Street, N.E.
20	Washington, D.C.
21	
22	Wednesday, April 24, 2002
23	10:30 a.m.

1	APPEARANCES:
2	COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
3	CHAIRMAN PAT WOOD, III, Presiding
4	COMMISSIONER LINDA KEY BREATHITT
5	COMMISSIONER NORA MEAD BROWNELL
6	COMMISSIONER WILLIAM L. MASSEY
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8	SECRETARY MAGALIE ROMAN SALAS
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12	ALSO PRESENT:
13	DAVID L. HOFFMAN, Court Reporter
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:30 a.m.)
3	CHAIRMAN WOOD: (Presiding) Good morning. This
4	open meeting of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
5	will come to order to consider matters which have been duly
6	posted in accordance with the Government in the Sunshine Act
7	for this time and place.
8	Please join me in the pledge to the flag.
9	(Pledge of Allegiance recited.)
10	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Madam Secretary?
11	SECRETARY SALAS: Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
12	Good morning, Commissioners. Before we proceed with the
13	consent agenda for this morning, we need a separate vote to
14	waive the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act 5
15	USC 552(b)(e)(1) to permit the following docket number and
16	companies to be added to the order to be considered today in
17	E-4.
18	Docket Number EC-99-101-006, Northern States
19	Power Company, Minnesota, and New Century Energies, Inc.
20	And Commissioner Breathitt votes first today.
21	COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: Aye.
22	COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: Aye.
23	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: Aye.
24	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Aye.

SECRETARY SALAS: The consent agenda for this

1	morning is as follows:
2	Electric items E-8, E-10, E-11 through E-14, E-
3	16, E-17, E-18, E-21, E-22, E-24, E-26 through E-28, E-29,
4	E-30, E-38, E-40, E-41, E-43 and E-45.
5	Gas: G-1 through G-8, G-13, G-15 through G-18,
6	G-20 through G-24, G-26, G-27 and G-29 through G-32.
7	Hydro: H-1 through H-3.
8	Certificates: C-2 and C-4 through C-7.
9	Miscellaneous: M-1.
10	The specific votes for these items are, on E-21,
11	Commissioner Brownell concurring with a separate statement,
12	and Commissioner Breathitt votes first.
13	COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: Aye.
14	COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: Aye with concurrences on
15	both E-8 and E-21.
16	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: Aye.
17	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Aye. Before we hop into the
18	items, I'd like to make a presentation to one of our
19	departing stars, that is to Heidi Marie Sanford of the
20	Commission's Office of External Affairs. Heidi is retiring
21	on May 3rd, and it's an appropriate time to honor her for 41
22	years and nine months of federal service, 18 of them as a
23	colleague here at the FERC.
24	For nearly two decades, she's been the go-to

1 person for information and publications that no one even had

ever heard of or knew what they were. She served the

Commission in the dual role as a public information officer

and as a Freedom of Information Act specialist.

Over these past several years, she's had responsibility for FOIA, and that's been an exponentially increasing responsibility, certainly as a result of the energy crisis in California and the September 11th attacks and the collapse of Enron. The requests for information from this agency for public disclosure purposes has been tremendous, and Heidi has met this challenge with determination and skill and the highest degree of professional commitment.

I got to know her myself when she sent a friendly e-mail making me feel welcome here. I really appreciated the personal touch that she adds to her job here. But it's nice to see a person that combines a solid record of public service with a delightful and charming personality. We will miss her very much. And in honor of her many years of service and of quality service, we want to give her today the Exemplar of Public Service Award.

(Applause.)

SECRETARY SALAS: The first item on the discussion agenda this morning is E-1, Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures. This

is a presentation by Michael Henry, James Ballard, Roland

Wentworth and Patrick Rooney.

2	MR. HENRY: Good morning, Chairman and
3	Commissioners. I'm Michael Henry. With me today are team
4	members Jim Ballard, Roland Wentworth and Patrick Rooney.
5	E-1 is a notice of proposed rulemaking or NOPR on
6	standardized generator interconnection agreements and
7	procedures that will be made a part of open access
8	transmission tariffs. These would remove roadblocks to
9	information infrastructure, permit open access transmission
10	and facilitate choices for customers to simplify and
11	standardize the processes for competitive entry.
12	This NOPR builds on the work that started with
13	the advance notice of proposed rulemaking and continued with
14	the efforts of industry participants who through a
15	collaborative process negotiated and crafted many provisions
16	of the consensus agreements and procedures filed by the
17	Commission in January.
18	These documents form the basis for the
19	interconnection agreement and procedures in this NOPR. The
20	NOPR explains that the Commission's current pricing policy
21	was used in negotiating the consensus interconnection
22	agreement and procedures. The NOPR seeks comment on whether
23	the current generation interconnection and transmission
24	pricing should be retained. It also requires those

commentors submitting alternative pricing methods to

1	identify and explain to what extent the NOPR interconnection
2	agreement and procedures must be modified and how these
3	proposals will ensure that rates are designed on a
4	consistent and comparable basis.
5	The NOPR concludes that a standard
6	interconnection agreement and set of procedures will resolve
7	recurring interconnection disputes and foster increased
8	generation development and reliability.
9	The NOPR invites public comment which will be due
10	45 days after the NOPR's publication in the Federal
11	Register.
12	Thank you. This concludes our presentation.
13	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Any thoughts?
14	COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: Just a couple of
15	thoughts. While we asked for comments on some of the
16	pricing issues, the way it's drafted seems to focus on LMP.
17	I would just encourage commentors to really look at pricing
18	comments on the whole SMD. I think it's important we have
19	another paper out there that we make sure that we're getting
20	the larger picture.
21	The other thing I'd love you to describe, because
22	I was really pleased to see it, is there's some special
23	provisions in here for smaller projects that I think will
24	make it easier to bring renewables on line more quickly,

1 which of course this Commission has spoken very favorably

1	of. Do you want to describe some of the ways in which that
2	will occur?
3	MR. ROONEY: Yes, I'll try. We're proposing
4	accelerated procedures for small generators and studies
5	limited in scope to the immediate vicinity of small
6	generators, the interconnection itself, and we ask that the
7	transmission providers use existing studies to the extent
8	possible at no cost to the small generators.
9	COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: Thank you.
10	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: I would like to commend our
11	Staff for their hard work on this. The documents associated
12	with this proposed rule are extensive, and I can see that a
13	lot of work has gone into it on Staff's part and also for
14	the industry as a whole.
15	There have been extensive negotiations over the
16	last few months, and I would like for someone to respond to
17	this question. To what extent have the negotiations been
18	successful in narrowing the scope of differences among
19	transmission providers and generators? In other words, how
20	close are we to a deal on all issues? Did they reach
21	agreement on most of the issues, the vast majority of
22	issues? How would you characterize it?
23	MR. ROONEY: I'd say that they reached consensus
24	on a lot of issues. I won't say the majority of the issues.

1 I think we pointed out in the order, there's about eight or

1	nine different issues where the generators and the
2	transmission providers had differences and that we had to
3	make a decision as to which way to go.
4	But in general, there was a lot of consensus that
5	was achieved as a result of the process that we went
6	through.
7	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: Is it your opinion that
8	that process was useful in getting where we want to go
9	ultimately on this rule?
10	MR. ROONEY: In this particular rule, yes, it was
11	useful. I think the narrower the scope of what we're
12	dealing with sometimes makes it easier as far as that type
13	of process.
14	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: I know there were some who
15	advocated that the Commission exercise its jurisdiction,
16	make jurisdictional calls here that were very aggressive in
17	terms of the reach of our jurisdiction. Others argued that
18	we ought to be fairly conservative in the approach that we
19	would take. Where do we end up in this rule? What do we
20	propose in terms of what generators would be subject to
21	these procedures?
22	MR. ROONEY: The small generators, for example.
23	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: Just in terms of where the
24	generator is located on the grid. For example, is the

1 generator selling at wholesale or retail, those kinds of

1	questions.
2	MR. HENRY: I can probably speak to that,
3	Commissioner. In the order we propose that the NOPR INIP
4	will apply only when the generator interconnects to the
5	transmission providers, the transmission system or makes
6	wholesale sales in interstate commerce at either the
7	transmission or the distribution voltage level.
8	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: So it seems to me that
9	those are areas where this agency clearly has jurisdiction
10	over interconnection policy. That seems to me to be a
11	fairly reasonable conclusion that we propose here.
12	We don't propose that these procedures apply to
13	all generators regardless of where they're located and
14	regardless of the purpose. A generator that interconnects
15	at the distribution level and plans to sell into the retail
16	market solely would not be covered by these procedures. Is
17	that correct?
18	MR. ROONEY: That's correct.
19	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: That would be subject to
20	state jurisdiction. Okay.
21	COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: This NOPR proposes the
22	adoption of two separate documents. One is the common set
23	of procedures for the generation interconnection itself.
24	The second is the generic standardized interconnection

1 agreement. Is that right?

Many of the proposals are the result of the
consensus-building process that Staff undertook with a lot
of people sitting in this room today. The hard work of all
who participated has paid dividends, and many of the
proposals in the NOPR reflects the consensus view of the
industry.

Mr. Chairman, when we started this, I had never been a part of our Commission employing an ANOPR process, and it worked well. That is something that was exported from your experience in Texas here, and I think maybe we'd be able to use it again, because I think it did work well. It was a lot of hard work at the beginning, but we are producing today a rulemaking that has made a lot of cuts that there is consensus on. So I applaud the Staff and others who worked hard on this effort.

The two areas that I would like to note have somewhat been talked about, and one is the pricing. The other is the treatment for small generators.

We had initially envisioned having the interconnection pricing done on a separate track, and indeed even a separate NOPR itself. It's my understanding that we're not going to have a separate NOPR on pricing, that we've included some pricing elements in this document. Is that correct?

MR. LARCAMP: That's correct.

## COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: The reason I understand

is that parties needed some pricing method to inform their comments and their decisions. So we are using the current pricing method as the baseline. But the NOPR recognizes that the current pricing method that we are using could be improved upon and seeks comments on whether other methods would be more appropriate. And I believe the document actually has a specific question that we are asking. It's not a concrete proposal at this time, but it does have a specific question that we are asking on pricing. So that will be good to get comment on.

This is an area of concern to many. A lot of the nation's governors have even gotten involved in this question. So I look forward to the comments on this important issue. And with regard to small generators, I believe that the NOPR process has resulted in a less onerous process for smaller generators to interconnect to the grid, something that my two previous colleagues have commented on and seem to be pleased with as well.

However, I would also like to hear from the affected parties on this issue. Small power producers should be a part of the nation's generation mix, and I support procedures to ensure that they have the legitimate ability to interconnect from the grid. I know that some of

1 them are farther away from transmission that makes it easy

1	to interconnect in areas where they are. We should make it
2	accessible and easier.
3	So thank you and everybody for all the hard work.
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1	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Looking back to before I came
2	here, observing the difficulty that generators were having -
3	- not across the country, but just some parts it was
4	clearly working well, but by and large, there were big parts
5	of the country a year ago that when there was at that time,
6	a dramatic upswing in the amount of generation that was
7	being built, primarily by the non-utility companies, that
8	there were obstacles that were being faced that were, in my
9	mind, needlessly being faced, and that needlessly prolonged
10	the attachment of needed power plants to our nation's grid.
11	11
12	I think the need for generic action was self-
13	evident, certainly, and I was glad that we all were of a
14	like mind as to that. On a policy basis, certainly it's
15	good to have a standard approach to something that lends
16	itself easily to standardization.
17	And on the administrative side, I do note with
18	lingering angst, that of the 40-some odd electric items on
19	today's agenda, about six of them relate to this
20	interconnection issue. That's a repeating number; it's
21	always about a half dozen or so that we're having to
22	basically remind a utility or two or three, or six

The best way to do that, I think, other than

what we've said in prior cases.

23

cranking out the paper as we do here, is to adopt it as a

generic action for the whole country. So that's one good purpose of rulemaking, is to, through an open process of discussion, as opposed to the one where the China wall comes up and we can't talk anymore, is to actually have a standard that is how it ought to work.

My general thought is that as we move forward and adopt this or something like this later this year, that this would be the standard contract that a customer could avail him- or herself of as them walk into a transmission owner RTO and say I want to build a power plant. Here's where I want to do it; here's what I need to do.

It has an aggressive schedule, an aggressive timetable to get those plants through the process, through the needed engineering studies and planing and interconnection issues that are a prerequisite for safe, reliable electricity, but also don't allow a utility that, in these days, still may have generation of its own, that it wants to favor the ability to slow those things down.

So, the substantive cuts that will remain here, will heat up well by the parties. They narrowed it down to nine issues. That's exactly what I hope we can utilize as we continue, is the SMD rulemaking, to see just how much consensus there is, then make the cuts on the lingering half dozen or so items. That's the world that I'm used to.

Quite frankly, we can handle keying up nine

items; keying up 129 is a little bit harder, and from our end, is not efficient. So I appreciate the hardworking participants from across the industry, both transmission owner and new generators and everybody else in between, and the strong Staff leadership we had during the ANOPR negotiations and on this process.

As a result of that process, there was a survey.

The results of the survey made pretty clear, as Linda just pointed out, that one of the things that people faulted the most, other than certainly some of the inefficiencies of trying something new for the first time, was that the pricing issue, while out there, there was a template that said we're going to assume the Commission's pricing policy, that that actually wasn't in play.

I guess, better late than never. So we had promised, as Linda pointed out, a separate pricing, but collapsing those two will actually allow people to look at both the implementation agreements and protocols and the pricing issue together, and will shorten up, we believe, the ultimate resolution of all this issue, so that it can be put forth and out into the market, and we can move on and get back to infrastructure getting on the grid.

So I look forward to comments here. I am comfortable with the cuts and decisions we made, but if you

all have something better, as you write back into us, we'll

1	read it, and certainly in the rulemaking process, as opposed
2	to adjudication, we can actually talk with you about it.
3	So, I look forward to that, as well. I support
4	and thank everybody for their hard work. Let's vote.
5	COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: Aye.
6	COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: Aye.
7	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: Aye.
8	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Aye.
9	SECRETARY SALAS: Next on the discussion agenda,
10	we will consider E-2 and E-20 together, Revised Public
11	Utility Filing Requirements. That's E-2, and E-20, Southern
12	Company Services, Inc. This will be a presentation by Gary
13	Cohen, Keith Pierce, Barbara Bourque, Ellen Shaw, and Andre
14	Goodson.
15	MR. COHEN: Good morning. E-2 is the Revised
16	Public Utility Filing Requirements Final Rule in Docket No.
17	RMON-8. This Draft Final Rule adopts revised filing
18	requirements for public utilities.
19	Under this rule, public utilities would file
20	electric quarterly reports covering transmission services,
21	cost-based power sales, market-based power sales, and other
22	generally applicable services, and will file standard forms
23	of agreement for the generally applicable services.
24	The electric quarterly reports will summarize the

1 pertinent terms of public utilities' current contractual

agreements, and provide specified data such as price, quantity, and the parties about the power sale transactions they made during the reporting period.

The new filing requirements will replace the current quarterly transaction reports that public utilities, including power marketers, file. The information reported in the new electric quarterly reports will be posted on the Commission's website, and be made available to the public in an accessible, user-friendly requirement.

The new filing requirements are designed to improve the quality and accessibility of information filed with the Commission, and fully satisfy public utilities' filing requirements under Section 205, and the Federal Power Act. The information will help the public and the Commission to detect instances of undue discrimination or undue preferences, and will promote price transparency.

The new filing requirements will, at the same time, reduce the filing burden on public utilities, and make use of electronic filing for the filing periods ending on July 31, 2002 and October 31, 2002. There will soon be posted on the FERC Internet website, a template for public utilities to download and use for the electric quarterly reports.

These first two reports use the interim filing

1 format. That will be replaced when software currently being

1	developed is completed. The final software format will use
2	the same data elements as in the interim filings, but will
3	make the information much more accessible and usable.
4	Andre Goodson will now deliver the presentation
5	for E-20.
6	MR. GOODSON: Good morning. E-20 concerns
7	request for rehearing of the Commission's May 27, 1999 Order
8	in which the Commission denied a request by Southern Company
9	to eliminate the requirement that traditional public
10	utilities with market-based rate authority will file long-
11	term service agreements, and, instead, allow such public
12	utilities to report all transactions, long-term as well as
13	short-term, in quarterly transaction summaries, as power
14	marketers are currently permitted to do.
15	Instead, the May 27 Order eliminated the
16	disparity between the requirements for traditional public
17	utilities and power marketers by requiring the marketers to
18	file their long-term market-based rate power sales service
19	agreements.
20	The May 27 Order held the new reporting
21	requirement in abeyance, however, until the issue went
22	through a final Order an rehearing. In view of the final
23	rule's elimination of the requirement that public utilities,

both traditional and power marketers, file long-term service

agreements, the draft Order rescinds the May 27 Order's

1	requirement that power marketers file their long-term
2	market-based power sales/service agreements and dismisses
3	the request for rehearing on this issue as moot.
4	Further, in view of the final rule's adoption of
5	electronic quarterly reporting for all public utilities, the
6	draft Order dismisses Southern's request for rehearing as
7	moot. That concludes my presentation.
8	COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: I just want to commend
9	the Staff for undertaking what was, admittedly, the most
10	daunting task in terms of reviewing enormous amounts of
11	detail. I think that what you have achieved is a really
12	good balance between the need for more transparency and
13	consumer protection and the business needs for
14	confidentiality, so that people can operate successfully in
15	this new market.
16	So I was impressed and have to share that
17	with the way you were able to balance those very strong
18	competing needs. While I'm sure everyone will not be
19	perfectly happy, I think you've done a terrific job.
20	I also think that this represents an efficiency
21	move that we need to undertake in everything that we do
22	every day. I thank you for your vision and your tenacity,
23	up to and including working out some of the details

yesterday afternoon.

1	rule, and I will be supporting it. It seems to me that what
2	we're trying to achieve here is much greater transparency in
3	terms of information that's available to market participants
4	and the public.
5	We have filing requirements now, but I take it,
6	based upon some of the conclusions of this rule, that the
7	requirements aren't well complied with, or the requirements
8	are confusing. What has been the nature of the problem of
9	noncompliance?
10	MR. COHEN: The quarterly transaction reports
11	have come in in a very inconsistent manner. The information
12	reported varies from report to report, and how it's
13	submitted by each company.
14	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: Why do we have confidence
15	that this rule will change that?
16	MR. COHEN: This rule adds specific data elements.
17	By going to the electronic format, it gets rid of a lot of
18	the vagueness that could be interpreted, as far as how the
19	information is to be presented.
20	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: Suppose I'm an entity that
21	has to report my transactional data to the Commission on a
22	quarterly basis? After this template is put in place, I
23	will take my data and make sure it complies with the
24	reporting template; is that right? Is that essentially a

1 computer program or computer software?

MS. BOURQUE: The interim template will specifically detail what has to be filed, in what order it has to be filed, so there won't be the ability to have inconsistent data filings. Once we go to the ultimate system, which we expect to have after the first two filing quarters, there will be error-checking software and editing software that will be external to the Commission, so that if incomplete data is attempted to be filed, it won't be allowed, and we'll be able to check a lot of that stuff outside the walls of the Commission, and we will have error-checking in the process, to make sure that the data is, to the extent at we can automatically do it, accurate.

At that point, also, after the first two interim filings, that data will be downloaded into a relational database where we'll have a multitude of search capabilities that will allow analysis and increased transparency by being able to search this data in many different ways. I think that if the filings -- if there are possible errors or abuses that might have been able to occur, and that can't be automatically detected, the fact that this information is going to be out there and so much more readily accessible, will allow Staff and the public to be better able to discern when there are filings that are incomplete or erroneous.

1 operated website that will have all this data on it?

MS. BOURQUE: Absolutely. One of the changes
between the NOPR and the rule that I think the industry will
be delighted with is that in the NOPR we had suggested that
each utility have their own website with this data, and we
said we were going to have a website also.

Upon reflection, and in looking at some of the comments, it just didn't seem very economically efficient to have something at every single utility that had to file this when we were going to be replicating the same process here at FERC. And we had to replicate that process at FERC.

The benefit of that, besides not forcing the utilities to spend money on developing these websites, is that there will be a uniform standard and presentation of all of this data, so that you get the same look and feel for every company, and you will be able to do cross-company analyses of data and be able to look at certain points, rather than just an individual company's filing.

That will occur after the ultimate system is implemented. The interim system will just have the data available, company-by-company in an electronic format, somewhat analogous to what's being filed now on paper, but it will be an electronic filing.

COMMISSIONER MASSEY: Let's say that the final reporting system is in place by the end of the year or the

1 first quarter of next year, and I'm a reporting company.

1	Now, I would take my data and enter it into my computer
2	system, I suppose, in a way that is compatible with FERC
3	requirements; is that correct?
4	MS. BOURQUE: Right, we'll have software that
5	we're going to be giving to the companies, so that the
6	formats will be dictated by us. Most companies who have
7	numerous transactions will electronically map their own
8	databases and their information systems to our formats.
9	Once that initial mapping goes forward, after the
10	initial mapping and the initial filing, it will be virtually
11	no effort for them to make their filings, and it will all be
12	in standard format. That's for the transaction data.
13	There's also the contract data. The contract
14	data will be also entered in a very specific format that
15	will be uniform for all companies, and it will be done
16	through software that we provide them, that will allow us to
17	be able to perform a variety of analyses on it when it gets
18	filed here and entered into a database.
19	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: You've actually led me to a
20	point that I would like to make, and that is some of the
21	parties in this proceeding suggested that we really ought to
22	move to monthly filing of this data.
23	And the rule rejects that proposal and says, no,
24	quarterly is fine. But I was thinking about that. I'm a

1 filer, and once I have a template established, I either hit

1	the SEND button every quarter or I hit it once a month or I
2	hit it once a week.
3	It's hard for me to see that requiring the data
4	to be filed more often is in any way more burdensome on the
5	industry, yet it might provide much greater, quicker
6	transparency in the marketplace, which, it seems to me,
7	ought to be what we support.
8	So I'm interested in any of your comments on that
9	point. Is there any additional burden to a filer? Once the
10	template is set up, is there any additional burden in
11	sending the data to the Commission on a monthly basis?
12	MR. COHEN: Once the software that we're talking
13	about is in place, it will not be an additional burden, but
14	it does raise the confidentiality issues.
15	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: How does it raise a
16	confidentiality issue?
17	MR. COHEN: By reporting it quarterly, there's a
18	lag of 30 days before the information is disclosed. If you
19	go to monthly, it will change that balance.
20	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: It just means the data is
21	disclosed more frequently, but it would still be a month
22	after, potentially a month after.
23	MR. COHEN: If it's within the period, it would
24	be 30 to 120. This will change it to be 30 to 60.

COMMISSIONER MASSEY: So we're still talking 30

1	to 60 days after the transaction took place, if it was filed
2	on a monthly basis.
3	MS. BOURQUE: Depending on how long we said after
4	that month it was to be filed, but you are correct in your
5	assumption that after the ultimate system is deployed and
6	stabilized, because any new system may have some issues and
7	we want to make sure that everything is working well, the
8	delta and burden between filing on a monthly and filing on a
9	quarterly basis is minimal.
10	MS. SCHALL: I think the balance comes in and
11	whether people can use prices and what use they can make of
12	them. And that's why the balance, I think, was proposed at
13	quarterly, to have the balance between transparency, and, as
14	some commenters argued, they're concerned about possible
15	anticompetitive effects of having so much price information
16	available.
17	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: In other words, the closes
18	to real-time that it is available, the more opportunity
19	there is for collusion. But if it's still going to be 30 to
20	60 days after the transaction, I wonder about that.
21	MR. LARCAMP: That's when the transaction is
22	initiated, right? The transaction may be ongoing.
23	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: I understand that the
24	transaction could be ongoing.

MR. LARCAMP: For a monthly or quarterly, but you

1	would presumably, on a quarterly, catch more short-term.
2	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: I just wanted to raise this
3	issue. And the other issue is, we don't require the filing
4	of the actual contracts, and I'm wondering whether this
5	template of data that we require is going to be as
6	transparent. Tell me why that's better.
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1	MR. COHEN: We did our best to identify all the
2	pertinent contract terms and have those be reported.
3	MR. LARCAMP: I think we also better because it
4	allows the searchable function going forward by having it in
5	the template format as opposed to having the agreement on
6	file. But having customers on the outside or Staff that are
7	looking to do a comparison, not having a searchable
8	function, if the contract is just here with the deviations,
9	coupled with the fact that if we're going to a standard form
10	of agreement with deviations for nonconforming contracts,
11	you know, the public will know, unless there's a
12	nonconforming on file, that the standard terms and
13	conditions are the standard terms and conditions, and they
14	can look for those to get the same information.
15	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: So you would argue that
16	this is greater information and greater transparency and
17	actually more user friendly because it will be in a format
18	where you can get on your computer and search the data sets
19	for whatever information you want?
20	MR. COHEN: That's correct.
21	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: I haven't said that
22	artfully, but that's essentially it.
23	MS. MARLETTE: Commissioner Massey, I think also
24	the public utilities would have to have the contracts

available at their place of business for public inspection

1	so they are obtainable.
2	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: They are obtainable. So we
3	think we're getting greater transparency here and the
4	contracts would still be obtainable and available.
5	Well, I support that provision. I think we're
6	doing the right thing, and it seems to me that we're getting
7	much greater transparency. This rule is a dramatic
8	improvement over what we had, and it has my strong support.
9	My minor quibble is, I would have supported the
10	rule that required the filers to hit the button every month
11	rather than every quarter to send the data to FERC. I still
12	think in the future as we gain more experience with this
13	rule, we ought to consider that again.
14	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
15	COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: A lot of the good things
16	about this order have been stated, and I would just like to
17	associate myself with my colleague's comments. I do think
18	that the quarterly though is appropriate and that we will
19	get information much sooner than well, in a format that
20	will be much more easily used by all parties.
21	I would also like to note that the burden
22	associated with preparing the electric quarterly reports is
23	estimated to be no more than two hours once the initial
24	setup is completed, which is going to take some time, as

1 compared to six hours per reporting period for the current

paper quarterly reports. So that will reduce the burden in terms of hours spent.

But I think the final rule does strike an appropriate balance between the Commission's and the public's need for timely information and the public utilities' concerns about the possibility of competitive injury through the disclosure of certain transactional informations, and I support the rule.

CHAIRMAN WOOD: As do I. I think it's a good example of good government at its best, harnessing the new technology as you all have laid out, eliminating much of the paperwork and the reporting burden without losing any of the benefits of the data that could come there, and in fact, for all the reasons you all have laid out, enhancing that data.

It treats all power sellers the same so we don't have this disparity which brings up the E-20 order. Makes markets transparent for customers in a way that really makes sense. I do look forward to us getting to the relational database. Appreciate the efforts of OCIO and the folks on the computer side who worked with us to get that interim template set up and look forward to getting the final database operational on time.

One of the things I was interested in was, in the December order which we called the data sets order, we

1 actually asked parties to contemplate aggregating the daily

data into a high, low and average category format. This order concludes that while that may have been a potentially lessening burden, it's not really envisioned under the Federal Power Act that we can do that.

Other agencies that have tried to do that, the ICC and the FCC, have both been told by courts with authority that that doesn't work. And they have the same kind of statutes we do. So really, transactional data is what this order requires. It's what the Commission, at least in its market-based certificates, has always required parties to report.

I noticed like Bill that that has probably been honored more in the breach than in the compliance, but there's nowhere to run here. You've got a database. You've got to fill it out. And as Barbara points out, it gets bounced out if you don't.

So, good. The future needs for new data and the lesser needs for old data we'll continue to look at, and the information initiative project that we discussed at about three or four meetings ago with Ginny and George on the Staff that are working that, and will be subject to, now that we have Mr. Hederman -- welcome, Bill -- with the Office of Market Oversight and Investigation here, certainly he and his folks will be able to, as they get their feet on

1 the ground, make an analysis of what it is we really need,

1	what may already be out there in fact from other reporting
2	requirements to other agencies as data that we need really
3	to handle the world that we're in now and not continue to
4	linger with the one we used to work with.
5	Finally, my hat's off to you all. I've enjoyed
6	working with you all these past three or four weeks on
7	pulling all this together and appreciate all the work that
8	went into getting us here. Because this is actually the
9	first formal order number, fill in the blank, since I've
10	been here. So I would propose that we make this order
11	number 2001 since that's what it was offered up for the
12	public to notice.
13	SECRETARY SALAS: We will do that, Mr. Chairman.
14	CHAIRMAN WOOD: I will support the order.
15	COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: Aye.
16	COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: Aye.
17	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: Aye.
18	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Aye.
19	SECRETARY SALAS: The next item on the discussion
20	agenda is E-3, Investigations of Terms and Conditions of
21	Public Utility Market-based Rate Authorizations, with a
22	presentation by Deborah Leahy, Joyce Kim, Jerome Pederson,
23	David Hunger and Michael McLaughlin.
24	MS. KIM: Good morning. E-3 addresses the

1 Commission's proposal to revise all existing market-based

rate tariffs and authorizations to include a provision prohibiting the seller from engaging in anticompetitive behavior or the exercise of market power and making the seller's market-based rate authority subject to refunds or other remedies as may be appropriate to address any anticompetitive behavior or exercise of market power.

The draft order requires all market-based rate tariffs and authorizations to include the following provision:

As a condition of granting market-based rate authority for short-term bilateral sales outside RTO/ISO markets with Commission-approved market monitoring and mitigation measures in place, the Commission reserves the authority to require refunds back to the first day of a transaction if it finds that the seller has engaged in anticompetitive behavior or the exercise of market power.

Such refunds would be available only if a complaint seeking refunds is filed no later than 30 days from the date the rates are reported to the Commission and made public.

The draft order requires that any alleged violation of the tariff provision be made on a transaction-specific basis.

Further, the draft order provides examples of

what the Commission might consider legitimate reasons for a

1	generator not offering its power during periods when the
2	market price exceeds its marginal cost and clarifies that
3	marginal costs include opportunity costs.
4	Another option would be to apply the refund

obligation in the tariff provision to all short-term transactions, thus including short-term transactions in organized spot markets.

Thank you.

COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: Walk me through, if you will, the implications for applying such conditions to those markets with a single clearing price, organized short-term markets. It strikes me as a rather complicated approach in organizations that in fact have other consumer protections in place. How does that work?

MR. HUNGER: If we were to do that, if we were to apply this condition in markets with a single clearing price auction, we would have to not only look at a specific transaction between a single buyer and a single seller. If market power had been exercised, that would raise the market clearing price, so all the other suppliers would be receiving a higher price, and all buyers would be paying the higher price.

So we would have to subject -- from there it follows that we would have to subject all sellers to

refunds, to potential refunds, once we identified how much

the guy who exercised market power raised the price. And in
order to make the market whole, all buyers would have to be
refunded, and sellers would have to figure out what each
seller owes. It's just sort of doing the market price
recalculation like we had to do in California, and our
thinking in this order was that while conceptually that
would be the way to remedy market power, the harm in terms
of introducing uncertainty into all sellers' ability to hang
onto the money they've made and just the issue of actually
recalculating all that makes it impose more harm than it
does good. The good being protecting consumers.
So there is this balance. The thinking in the
drafting of this order was it went too far. If we went into
markets, single clearing price markets. In addition, those
markets already have something in place. So we weren't so
much trying to pick on non-RTO/ISO markets as trying to make
sure we have something in place in markets where there isn't
anything in place. That's why we narrowed it down to the
bilateral markets that don't have market mitigation.
COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: That don't have other
consumer protections in place that have been approved by
this Commission?
MR. HUNGER: Yes.
COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: Kind of then walk me

1 through, assuming that that answer is put aside, that we're

really focusing on markets where there are not existing consumer protections or organizations like RTOs there to protect them, just walk me through how this works. Because I think one of our goals, and I think you've achieved it, is this balance for the need for consumer protection which we all agree on, but some limitation to the exposure for those in the market who can't function successfully with kind of a never ending expectation of refunds.

So just walk us all through the timing and how it works and what the exposure is if you would, please.

MR. HUNGER: Sure. The heart of it I think is the ;buyer would have the opportunity to come in and say, look, this guy exercised market power on me or engaged in anticompetitive behavior and raised a price I had to pay, and we recognize that the seller in turn might have legitimate reasons to have offered up his power at what appears to be higher than his marginal cost or higher than his running costs.

There are a lot of reasons why a seller who has a hydro facility, in some sense their running cost is very close to zero. But they have these huge opportunity costs. Imagine a plant facing an emissions limitation on the number of hours they can run. These guys have legitimate opportunity costs. So while we try to let the buyer come in

and say, look, it looks like there's been market power

exercised here because we have to protect -- that's our job, one of our jobs, part of our job. But on the other hand, we try to recognize the position the sellers are in as well.

And as far as the process, it's tied to the quarterly reporting that just went out in E-2. In order to limit the amount of exposure, that was one of the issues that commentors raised.

We heard some very compelling arguments from suppliers, people who built plants, people who want to build plants, people who finance people who build plants, that this was introducing an awful lot of uncertainty to these markets. And so we really wanted to not only pin down who exactly would be potential subject to refund, but for how long.

So the person who is claiming to be harmed is tied down, has 30 days to come in after the quarterly reports come in, so they'll have a chance to look at it. In that way, again, a balancing act here between providing certainty on the supply side and protection on the demand side. And that's where we came down in this draft order.

COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: Share with us, if you will, some of the examples that you give as to conditions that might exist that would legitimately cause someone to withhold from the market. Because I think whatever we do in

1 providing certainty, we also need to provide some discipline

and guidance so we don't entertain a lot of what might be
deemed to be frivolous suits.

I think the clarity that we give in terms of what we consider appropriate or inappropriate is helpful.

MR. HUNGER: Sure. There's issues like maintenance, scheduled maintenance. Plants need to go down. There's issues about, gee, this is a 500 megawatt plant.

Why are they only offering up 450 megawatts? Well, the plant owners, and maybe if it's a day ahead or a sort of medium-term contract, they don't know exactly what the availability of their unit is going to be, so you have to be a little bit careful. And maybe they won't offer all of it up, or they'll offer the last few megawatts up at a very high price and that's to ensure that they cover this probabilistic availability.

They don't know exactly how much. The ones I think are easier to think about, think of the hydro plants. It's May and the price is \$60 a megawatt hour or something, but you think the price is going to be \$90 a megawatt hour in July and you've only got so much water. You have to make a choice about whether to run now or later.

In some sense, we want these guys making the choice. That's an efficient allocation of resources when the water gets run in the summer when the value is higher.

And, of course, there are plants that face different

1	environmental constraints and places where there aren't
2	tradable permit markets. Some plants have a straight you
3	can run 750 hours out of the year. So they have to choose.
4	The guy running this business would want to run in the 705
5	highest priced hours of the year, and we want him to do
6	that. Of course, they can't pick it exactly.
7	So there are lots of times when there are
8	legitimate reasons not to be running. Those are pretty
9	verifiable reasons. It's a pretty easy story to tell.
10	Look, I've only got so much water. I can't be running all
11	the time. Or look, this is an old plan. It wasn't meant to
12	run this hard, and I need to be careful with this thing or
13	it's not going to be available in the summer.
14	So I think we've heard these stories before.
15	There are a lot of good reasons not to run. And of course,
16	there's plain old withholding, too, to drive up price. We
17	want to eliminate that. Let's pin down all the legitimate
18	and verifiable reasons not to be running or to be offering
19	up your power at a high price.
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repeat again that the order as drafted which creates I think
some certainty for both those in the market providing the
commodity and the consumers who are being served as well as
I think some good guidance in terms of what's acceptable
behavior and what is not. I think we've achieved that
balance. My own inclination would be to limit this
application outside of the organized markets because it
seems to me somewhat redundant and somewhat counterintuitive
to say that we're setting up market monitoring and consumer
protections that we've approved but we're going to add yet

another overlay on this. That strikes me as not terribly

productive. I'll listen to what my colleagues have to say,

COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: Thank you. I'd just

but thank you.

COMMISSIONER MASSEY: I think one of the key motivations for this tariff condition was our experience in California. Our orders in the California case found a dysfunctional market. I don't know that we ever found any bad behavior. I don't know, there was one incident in which there was bad behavior but otherwise we didn't point any fingers. We said it was a dysfunctional market that led to the high prices. In the California crisis, the prices began to spike in May and June of the year 2000 and were very high for almost a year. By the time a complaint was filed and a

refund condition set, it was October 2nd. That was the

refund trigger. So from May of 2000 until October 2nd, there was no refund condition in place, and so no opportunity for a refund. So how would this condition change that situation?

MR. HUNGER: I don't think this proposal changes that situation as much as this proposal recognizes that the situation has changed in California and these other markets that they have now put in place some form of Commission recognized and approved market power mitigation so that I won't happen in the first place.

COMMISSIONER MASSEY: I think the point I'm making, perhaps not as directly as I should, is that when we first took this up several months ago, I said I felt we needed a refund condition that was triggered by a dysfunctional market. Frankly I still think that's what we need. There aren't the votes for that on this Commission, I don't believe, but I wanted the record to be clear that that would be my preference. It seems to me that this problem is arising from the California crisis and yet our approach here doesn't really solve that problem of a market that it out of control because it's dysfunctional and there's no bad behavior that we found. And yet all of the burden of that dysfunction falls on the customers, the consumers, and I object to that, but that's point number one.

Point number two is I think just last month, or

1	within the last few months, we concluded that a seller had
2	exercised market power in PJM's ICAP market. That is
3	probably our best market. There is Commission approved
4	mitigation in place I think. Now it strikes me as unusual
5	that we would exempt all ISO RTO markets from this condition
6	when that I think is the only case I can recall in recent
7	memory where we've actually found the exercise of market
8	power and it happened to be in an ISO RTO-type market. So
9	what is your response to that? Why would we want to exempt
10	those markets from this condition?
11	MR. HUNGER: I think unfortunately something,
12	when you have to strike a balance, I think you have to give
13	something up. The thinking there is while we recognize that
14	there may be something that could slip through the cracks in
15	an RTO or ISO market, with market power mitigation in
16	effect, the harm done to these markets by imposing a
17	condition like this would exceed the potential benefit from
18	avoiding an instance like that in the case where the
19	problem's been fixed by PJM.
20	But you're right. The market power was
21	exercised. We were finding that nobody got their money
22	back.

COMMISSIONER MASSEY: This tariff condition is basically about taking the refund effective date and pushing

1 it back in time. That's essentially what this does because

without a tariff condition at all, there is generally no refund condition. Someone has to file a complaint or this Agency initiates a complaint, and then 60 days thereafter is the earliest date under Section 206 that we could have a refund protection in place. And so this tariff condition says we want the ability to reach back and as long as the complaint is filed within 30 days of the reporting, we want to be able to reach back and impose a refund condition for that bad behavior. As far as it goes, I support that. I think that is a very good idea. I wish it went a little further. But I support it as far as it goes. But isn't that what this is all about essentially? The bottomline here is pushing to an earlier point in time what the refund effective date is and triggering it by a bad behavior condition.

MR. LARCAMP: Commissioner, my own view is that we are trying to comply with the directives in 206 with respect to the refund effective date. We are, in exercising authority under 205, to allow sellers to engage in market-based transactions. We are attaching a condition that we believe is necessary to ensure that their rates will remain just and reasonable, so I don't believe that we are, I mean that may be the practical effect, but I don't think that we are trying to change the refund effective date. I think we

are recognizing this in this evolving marketplace here that

particularly I think until we have better markets in place,
through standard market design, that we need to be more
comfortable that our grant of market-based rates will in
fact result in rates that are just and reasonable.

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COMMISSIONER MASSEY: I agree with that goal, but the practical effect, however, everybody may have different motivations, but isn't the practical effect, doesn't it have to do with the refund effect?

MS. MARLETTE: Can I just jump in? I agree with Dan. The practical effect yes is to provide some added refund protection for customers but this order has drawn a very careful balance not to circumvent the restrictions in 206, but to pinpoint that category of sales where we think there is the greatest potential to exercise market power and narrowly tailor what we're doing the refund condition to that category of sales. I think what a lot of this boils down to is the Commission's confidence in the market mitigation that it has put in place in the organized spot markets, and the reason the staff came to the conclusion that this should only apply to the bilateral short-term sales outside of ISO markets is because the Commission has put in place your market mitigation. There may be circumstances, we thought we'd resolved the problems in California we hoped. There may be circumstances in other

1 areas of the country where you may never get the market

mitigation perfect and you have to over time adjust it accordingly. But the presumption here is that the Commission has done its best job to get that mitigation right at that particular point in time, and therefore we don't need that added protection.

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And again, as Dave and others have said, the other issue is balancing it against the huge regulatory uncertainty you create if you apply this to a bigger category of sales.

MR. LARCAMP: Staff I think has been pretty up front that we're trying to balance effective oversight and protection of customers in terms of the rate side with the protection of customers by getting additional infrastructure built. That in my mind is the most effective way to discipline price and protect customers. And I think we see the balance where the Commission has already specified monitoring and mitigation in spot markets as enough to focus this condition in those markets where there isn't existing monitoring or mitigation in place, and where the customers I think are most susceptible because with these short-term transactions, they are really more likely to be forced to buy from a seller that may be seeking to exercise market power as opposed to longer-term transactions where they can say, fine, I'll build my own plant or I'll contract with

someone to build and I will through my actions in either

contracting or adding my own supply long term defeat your attempt at exercise of market power to me and my customers.

COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: I'm going to support a lot of what you're saying too, Bill. The November 20th order proposed a condition to be applied to all existing market-based tariffs, which is what we're talking about to prohibit sellers from two things; from engaging in anticompetitive behavior and from the exercise of market power. Now this is a very logical premise and it goes without saying. However, the implementation of this needs careful thought and structure because how we change the tariff is crucial to both consumer confidence and healthy, well-functioning markets.

There were a lot of legitimate concerns raised in the comments and at the technical conference that we held at FERC last month, and many said the proposed tariff condition was overly broad or vague. Those were sentiments that I expressed last fall when this was first discussed, and I think pretty vocally, as I recall. There were also comments expressing concerns about the uncertainty in the marketplace that could result from this refund condition being applied.

So the Commission was left with balancing this balance we're talking about, balancing the need to protect consumers against unreasonable and unjust rates with the legitimate

1 concerns that I stated and that other parties have stated.

So I am open to approaches and options for limiting that uncertainty and I think the order does that in a lot of areas. But over the past several weeks, we internally and at the technical conference have discussed several means to clarify the scope and the application of this refund condition. We could limit the application of the condition to short-term bilateral market-based rate sales. Other options are to clarify that request for refunds be made on a transaction-specific basis and that complaints be made within reasonable time frames.

Other options would be to exempt RTOs and ISOs with Commission approved monitoring and mitigation. Quite frankly, exempting short-term sales in RTOs and ISOs from this tariff condition is fraught with difficulty. My concern about this option is one of equity. We need to have fair and equal treatment for market participants across the country. I don't believe that exempting a few areas of the country from this provision while imposing aa refund condition on the majority of the market is equitable. This bifurcated approach may also have some unintended consequences. For example, trading could be affected as parties decline to sell into certain areas, favoring other areas instead or new products can be introduced that are later discovered to have flaws or a lack of transparency.

So let me say that my reluctance to exempt RTOs

doesn't come from a concern that the market monitoring in these markets is necessarily deficient. It doesn't come from that at all because I believe the Commission is trying to do a good job with getting the market monitors up and running and doing what they are going to be and are being required to do. However, I know that even RTOs with market monitoring, the Commission still has complaints filed concerning the rates for short-term transactions, especially in the day-ahead and the real time markets. There is an anonymous nature to trading in short-term markets and it just make sense to me to not exempt RTOs from this tariff provision for now.

With short-term markets, I think you lose some transparency that you have in bilateral deals and even in RTOs where we have approved market monitoring, dysfunction is still somewhat of a work in progress. So once again, my preference would be to treat all areas of the country equitably and the same in applying a refund condition. I wasn't comfortable going down this path back in the fall. I understood why we needed to do it but if we're going to embark on a new method to attach to approving market-based rates, I think it needs to be fair and equitable and applied in all areas of the country and not just in areas where there are not RTOs.

CHAIRMAN WOOD: Let me just throw out where I am.

1	I, like Nora, think it's not fair and equitable now. And
2	right now you have organized spot markets that have a lot of
3	rules over them in the ISOs. And I don't even believe that
4	the one RTO that we have approved has the organized spot
5	markets, so in the four ISOs that we've got, we do have a
6	lot. We have RTO or ISO market monitoring units. We have a
7	batch of mitigation tools which have been substantially
8	revised. Certainly in California, we're still working on
9	what those would look like. But I've seen a lot of
10	revisions on the ones in New England, we've got one in New
11	York, and I haven't seen anything new in PJM lately but I'm
12	sure we'll see it. So today there's already a higher
13	standard set where there are organized spot markets and I'm
14	kind of looking at I think we need to make sure that the
15	people in Colorado and Louisiana and Nevada all have some
16	protection as well. We've got the market monitoring units
17	and the prospective mitigation. We now have our Office of
18	Market Oversight set up and starting to staff up soon. I
19	think there will be, Bill, some instances where water slips
20	under the bridge. In the ICAP PJM case, that is a good
21	example, but I think the tools that we have set up, not in
22	this order, but that we've set up through all the other
23	dockets that we've got have in fact set up on early warning
24	systems that are more sophisticated than the ones we had

1 twenty months ago out west than we had anywhere.

1	And I think, to come back I guess to Cindy's
2	words, that balance. Yes, there might be a couple that slip
3	through like PJM's ICAP but the offsetting balance to that
4	is that we have set it up to where we are now allowing
5	really basically seven more months, and people could do
6	without this provision, for them to assay the market, assay
7	the data from the market that we juts approved in the last
8	item and do something about it. So I think the cost of
9	regulatory risk would ultimately be borne by customers and
10	the steps that are taken elsewhere in this order and I think
11	we all do agree that are significant in handing that balance
12	back to where it ought to be. And I think, Linda, you made
13	those out focusing on short-term, focusing on the additional
14	five-month window, the quarterly reporting period plus the
15	30 days for the power marketer to file his quarterly
16	reporting report plus the 30 days for the buyer whose
17	aggrieved to file a complaint here.
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Those additional five months do reduce what I
call the yawning black hole of refund obligations, such that
the back door really is shut. I think that's a pragmatic
response.

I think that also, David, you laid them out very well. The examples of physical withholding and economic withholding that we had not really defined before are in this Order to give a lot of context to what is, in effect, the pragmatic, must-offer requirement for everybody, which says we're going to expect you to make your product available unless you have these exceptions, such as down for maintenance, the opportunity costs for hydro, et cetera.

We've learned a lot from California. Certainly I think the main lesson we've learned on that one is that before we start putting that must-offer requirement in there, people really didn't know that it was illegal to withhold, and you could go after a Sherman Act case. But by the time your grandchildren are through college, those might get resolved.

So, trying to do it in a realistic timeframe here is a good thing. The pragmatic, must-offer requirement really comes through this Order to me as a definite positive step.

So I understand, and, Linda and I talked last

1 night again about this, and you're looking at this as

1	disadvantaging customers in non-RTO ISO markets. I guess I
2	view it that the customers in those markets right now have
3	protections that I'd like to see go to the rest of the
4	country while we're still getting RTOs set up everywhere
5	else. So this is transitional.
6	I do think that David laid out a couple, and
7	Staff briefed me last night about the downsides of getting
8	into a spot market, a single clearing price spot market.
9	Your line of questioning kind of brought some of that out,
10	Nora.
11	I think that's more negative for the market in
12	terms of the regulatory risk premium that customers have to
13	pay than I think we gain by capturing that. I recognize
14	that some will get through, but I don't think it's
15	prophylactic either way, but it's what we need to do here,
16	look at where the greatest potential for sellers to exercise
17	market power is and do something about it. My preference
18	would be to go with the exception for the RTO/ISO markets,
19	although I'm sensing that we're probably split on that
20	issue. We can talk about it some more. We can more along
21	and come back to this some other day.
22	Anything else?
23	COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: Just one clarification
24	My uneasiness and discomfort with this particular provision

1 was that I felt that consumers -- it wasn't that consumers

1	in non-KTO areas would be disadvantaged. It was that the
2	treatment for consumers all across the country should be the
3	same, and I didn't want consumers in areas where there were
4	RTOs to be disadvantaged.
5	There's one part of the Order that I do like, and
6	that is the burden of proof would be placed upon the
7	Commission if we institute a complaint on our own motion,
8	or, on a complaining party, the burden would be on either us
9	or the complainant to well-support and to prove their case,
10	and the party who is being complained about would be in the
11	mode of explaining and defending their actions.
12	So I thought that was good. There is a lot in
13	the Order that I like. It's just this one provision on the
14	exemption that I didn't.
15	CHAIRMAN WOOD: I think that's where we all are.
16	There's a lot of good here, and I do think it's important
17	for us to have this discussion, even though we're not at
18	consensus on with the whole Order.
19	It's important that on what I consider the really
20	big-ticket issues, that we are. I think that's important
21	for the outside world to know, and the main reason I wanted
22	us to have this discussion today.
23	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: I think I will be more
24	confident, once the standard market design is in place,

1 because our working paper lays out the kinds of mitigation

that we want to see. As I recall, it's much more specific
and essentially says this will be a part of the standard
market design.

I would take more comfort from a tariff condition that says once you're in within the standard market design, once that is applicable to you, and once the standard market design-type markets are set up with the mitigation in place, then the condition does not apply. So I don't know whether there is any room for common ground with a proposal like that, but I'd be willing to vote for that as a compromise.

CHAIRMAN WOOD: Let's kick that around the next couple of weeks and see what we can do.

MS. MARLETTE: Mr. Chairman, could I raise one issue, just for the benefit of the outside? And it's on something that I don't think we've discussed here, but on which I do think there's agreement. And there was great fear on the outside that whatever condition the Commission would come up with, it would somehow apply it retroactive to the refund-effective date.

This Order does not do that. Any condition would be applied prospectively only, only take effect after the Order issues, and I think there is uniformity on that, just to allay that concern.

COMMISSIONER MASSEY: My preference would be to

1 have a dysfunctional market condition. I wouldn't dissent

1	on that basis, because I know that when I raised that the
2	last time around, there weren't the votes for that, and
3	there still aren't the votes, and I'm sort of the Lone
4	Ranger on that point, and I realize that.
5	So I think what we have here, from my
6	perspective, is half a loaf or more. I agree with the
7	provisions in here that lay out the rationale for this. I
8	agree with the provisions that define opportunity costs with
9	more specificity, and that lay out that there are instances
10	in which withholding of generation is justified, based upon
11	the facts, and I agree with all of that.
12	So, there are provisions of this proposal that I
13	like. This exempting of ISO/RTO markets, at this point in
14	time, that really concerns me. And I have listened to the
15	debate on that, and I still have the same point of view on
16	that. So that's really where the rubber meets the road for
17	me on this proposal right now. That exemption troubles me a
18	great deal.
19	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Could that be remedied by
20	defining with a lot more specificity, what we mean by
21	Commission-approved market monitoring and mitigation?
22	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: I'd be willing to look at
23	that. It could very well.
24	CHAIRMAN WOOD: All right, we will move on to the

1 next item. Thank you all very much.

1	SECRETARY SALAS: The next item on the discussion
2	agenda is E-4, Trans Link Transmission Company, LLC, and
3	others, with a presentation by Allen Haynes, David Hunger,
4	Laurie White, and Michael McLaughlin.
5	MR. HAYNES: Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I am
6	Allen Haynes, and with me are the other members of the Trans
7	Link team, Laurie White and leftover from E-3, David Hunger.
8	8
9	(Laughter.)
10	MR. HAYNES: We have this morning, a draft Order
11	concerning the proposal by several private and public
12	transmission owners and one electric cooperative to form an
13	independent transmission company or ITC that would perform
14	certain RTO functions delegated to it by the Midwest ISO.
15	The draft Order accepts the application to form
16	Trans Link, with certain modifications. The acceptance of
17	this proposal furthers the Commission's strategic plan,
18	particularly in Objective 2.1, which is to advance
19	competitive market institutions across the entire country,
20	and Objective 1.1, removing roadblocks impeding market
21	investment.
22	This Order establishes a framework for effective
23	and efficient delegation of RTO functions to a for-profit
24	dedicated transmission company. This hybrid framework

1 combines the natural incentives for efficiency and

innovation of the ITC with the advantages of the regional perspective inherent in the RTO.

The development of ITCs also has the potential to encourage greater investment in transmission infrastructure.

Trans Link proposes to offer transmission service for all transmission requests whose source and sink are in the Trans Link footprint.

It proposes to maintain and operate the transmission facilities contributed by sale or agreement by the participant companies. Trans Link proposes to operate seamlessly in close coordination with the Midwest ISO, according to a series of protocols agreed to by both parties, which explicitly provide for one-stop shopping for open-access transmission service.

The draft order accepts the applicant's proposal to transfer control of their transmission assets to Trans

Link and to perform those functions that can be delegated from the RTO.

The Order does modify the proposal in a few respects: Trans Link must provide transmission service under the Midwest ISO open-access tariff, rather than its own, however, Trans Link is authorized to maintain its own schedule in the Midwest ISO tariff.

It must also operate solely through the Midwest ISO OASIS
and not through its own node. The draft order further
describes how TransLink can provide certain functions
related to ancillary services, total transmission capability
calculation and planning and expansion.

The overriding objective of the draft order is to allow incentives for facility and efficiency enhancement without placing in jeopardy a seamless market for wholesale bulk power in the whole Midwest region.

This concludes my presentation. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: I will be concurring on this order and also on the Alliance order today. And I would like to explain that reasoning. I am pleased that we are voting out this order and the Alliance order today, because in doing so, we are taking a necessary step forward in approving an independent transmission company model and making an initial cut on the functions that an ITC under an RTO umbrella will be able to share with the RTO.

I agree with my colleagues that it is important
at this time to give certainty to these ITC entities that
can bring significant benefits to the industry, including
improved asset management, development of innovative
services, and improved access to capital in order to build
the infrastructure we desperately need in many parts of the

1 country.

1	I am concurring on today's orders because I agree
2	in principle that we should make these difficult calls. And
3	I agree with the logic on each of the separate decisions on
4	the functions we are allowing the ITC to share with the RTO.
5	However, I am still concerned that our calls on
6	each of the functions taken as a whole may not allow ITCs to
7	fully prosper and fulfill all the bright promise that we see
8	in these entities. I am frankly worried that we are using
9	one hand to pat ITCs on the back for bringing us a structure
10	that we hope will result in an infrastructure and improved
11	use of their existing interstate transmission lines, but on
12	the other, we are taking away many of the functions that
13	they asked to retain to be a viable business under that
14	structure.
15	I really hope I'm wrong, and I'll be the first to
16	shout. I'm not promising that I'll do it in this room in a
17	month from now.
18	(Laughter.)
19	COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: But I hope that I'm
20	wrong. Although I hope that TransLink and Alliance will see
21	today's order in a positive light and find that there is
22	substantial ability for them to go forward with their
23	business models.

I am willing to entertain changes to these

1 functional assignments if ITCs inform us that we have not

given enough functionality to support the future viability of these companies.

Today's order narrows the possibilities for

TransLink that the Commission envisioned an ITC would be able to perform under the MISO Appendix I filing. For example, Appendix I set forth the responsibilities that can be delegated to an ITC either entirely or subject to varying degrees of oversight. Some of these include security coordination, Section 205 rights, congestion management, line loss calculations, tariff administration, operations and market monitoring.

I have not listed all of the Appendix I responsibilities, but of the ones that I mentioned, we are allowing very limited Section 205 rights for TransLink, and we allow some scheduling, and we are allowing certain planning functions; clearly, not all of the Appendix I responsibilities. However, I don't see this order as setting precedent and excluding the many functions that we allow ITCs to perform under Appendix I, but instead allows ITCs to make their case before us each time on the functions that we will allow under Appendix I.

Finally, I note that in making the first cut on these functions for an ITC within an RTO, we do not make any findings or prejudice in any way the viability of a stand-

1 alone ITC. Because I fully support the stand-alone ITC

1	model if we ever see one or get one. I believe that an ITC
2	certainly can add value as a functioning RTO, and I urge my
3	colleagues to move forward in addressing these issues
4	sometime in the near future.
5	Thank you.
6	COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: I just have a couple of
7	brief comments. One of the things that struck me in reading
8	submissions on the TransLink proposal was what I think is a
9	very solid relationship and a fair degree of flexibility in
10	that relationship between MISO and TransLink which I think
11	bodes well for what I think is a process of evolution.
12	I appreciate one of your comments on Appendix I
13	that the world, it strikes me, has changed so dramatically,
14	and this Commission's view of the world since Appendix I,
15	that I think we need to look at that in view of where we are
16	today, as I think we probably and I would encourage
17	TransLink and the MISO to look at the protocols they've
18	established in view of what is coming down in terms of
19	standard market design and how they're going to synchronize
20	certain responsibilities in the market as we now envision
21	it.
22	So I feel not that we have limited their
23	opportunities, but I think we've laid out enormous

opportunities for TransLink to succeed. And I have greater

1 confidence in that success because of what appears to be a

1	pretty solid working reasonable relationship between MISO
2	and TransLink. So I feel good about this, and I'm really
3	excited as we move forward with these new business models.
4	And I certainly think that this Commission has expressed
5	time and time again a willingness to reevaluate certain
6	decisions in view of the rapid market changes that we see.
7	So, thanks.
8	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: I think this is a very
9	important order. We start here to make concrete decisions
10	about the appropriate role of the ITC within an RTO. More
11	specifically, what functions may be deleted to the ITC.
12	If we get this right, then I think we can
13	productively harness the profit motive and innovation that
14	it brings to help us realize Order 2000's goal of efficient
15	and reliable grid operation that serves as a platform for
16	seamless competitive markets. If we get it wrong, then we
17	may prolong the balkanized markets and biased decisionmaking
18	that stands in the way of efficiency that market solutions
19	promise.
20	I think today's order gets it right in virtually
21	all respects. The order states that the Commission's belief

I think today's order gets it right in virtually
all respects. The order states that the Commission's belief
that for effective RTO operations, regional trading and onestop shopping, a single transmission provider must have
overall authority and ultimate responsibility for

1 transmission service in the region. And the basic decisions

made in today's order are largely consistent with that vision.

For example, there can be only a single tariff and a single OASIS site for the RTO region. And it must be administered by the Midwest ISO/RTO. There can be only a single congestion management regime to be administered by the RTO. The RTO is ultimately responsible for calculating ATC, is responsible for reliability for the region, manages parallel pathflow.

The ITC here, TransLink, is delegated certain functions that are primarily local in nature and allow the ITC to implement its business model. For example, the ITC can file rate design and revenue requirement proposals with the Commission. It can maintain a separate rate schedule under the RTO tariff, have physical control of its facilities and provide data inputs for ATC calculations.

Today's order is largely consistent with what I regard as the proper but important role of an ITC as a component of an RTO. Overall grid and market operation must be performed by an independent regional transmission provider, in other words, the RTO. As our paper on standard market design says, the basis of good grid and market operation is a security constrained, bid-based dispatch.

The RTO must do this and its execution of the dispatch must

not be compromised by sharing that function with subregional

entities or entities that have assets in the game.

The ITC's important and potentially profitable role within the RTO is to maximize transfer capability over its transmission facilities and help alleviate congestion.

The ITC can do this by adding capacity, by improving maintenance practices and possibly adding devices that improve operation. By increasing transfer capability, the ITC can gain valuable tradable transmission rights to the grid that it can use or sell in hedging services and earn a profit. The ITC could also receive performance-based rates for lowering grid costs.

As with generation and load, the ITC provides another resource to the RTO for reliable and efficient grid operation.

There are two aspects of today's order that I would like to raise and express, I wouldn't call it concern, but at least I want to point them out and to indicate that I will be watching how these issues evolve over time. One of them is allowing the TransLink ITC to control or schedule transmission service where the source and sink is within its footprint. As long as there is adequate coordination with MISO to ensure that MISO can monitor the impacts of the transactions scheduled by TransLink.

Now in the current operational environment out

1 there, that might work. But under a standard market design

regime, I don't see how that does work, and I raise that concern here. I don't understand within a standard market design regime which we're moving to how the scheduling functions can be shared within a region. I am concerned that such a sharing isn't consistent with standard market design.

My understanding is that the fundamental element, this is the core of it, of the standard market design proposal, is a security constrained, bid-based dispatch performed on a regional basis. This would undoubtedly be run by a sophisticated computer program that necessarily looks over the entire grid in the region to decide what dispatch is optimal and then to adjust it every five minutes. This dispatch is the basis for determining the locational marginal prices that are the heart of the standard market design.

I am trying to come to grips with how more than one entity within a region can accomplish this. I take note of PJM's comments on this matter. They say that the functional operation of the grid must be the responsibility of the entity that is running the locational marginal pricing-based markets and that those functions cannot be separated out, or there will be chaos. Frankly, this makes a lot of sense to me.

So I take some comfort in the likelihood that the

scheduling coordination between MISO and TransLink will be temporary as we move to day two congestion and standard market design implementation. Today's order notes that as we move towards those events, some of the decisions on operational control may have to be modified to support MISO's implementation of locational marginal pricing and standard market design.

The order also states clearly the Commission's belief that a security constrained economic dispatch needed for efficient and reliable market operation is best operated by an independent regional transmission provider. So I raise that point, and I will be watching how this issue evolves.

I also want to raise a point on the issue of planning. The order allows the ITC to operate its own planning process as long as MISO has the final word on the plan as it affects facilities outside of the ITC footprint.

My own view is that for the MISO region, MISO should ultimately have the final word on all aspects of the planning process and take input from the ITCs from all stakeholders.

I would prefer that an asset-neutral entity, an entity that does not own either demand resources, that does not own generation, that does not own transmission, that

1 does not have skin in the game, so to speak, that might buy

us the decisionmaking process. I would prefer that an asset-neutral entity run the planning process. But I am comforted by the fact that the MISO RTO will have the final word on planning, at least as it relates to the seams within the RTO between the ITCs and the other areas, and I will be watching this issue as well.

I'm not entirely confident that we have made what will ultimately be the right call on planning. I think that's an important function, and I raise that issue here.

But today's order is a giant step in the right direction.

It gets it right I think in virtually all respects. I raise only these two points of concern. The order has my full and wholehearted support.

CHAIRMAN WOOD: I'll just add for this case and the next with the principles that have guided me on the slice-and-dice issues that we have really grappled with since we had a public discussion of them in October of last year.

First of course is independence. We welcome independence in transmission however we can get it. This certainly was an adequate way. I think we did have a few issues on the TransLink board selection and rotation process but by and large found that to be a sufficiently independent entity, and proved that I think independence just builds

1 trust from the market, and that's what we have to have to

kind of make wholesale markets work. Basically, we have to have the trust.

Second, what do they do for infrastructure? Will this be the kind of entity that can adequately build and respond to transmission needs that we know are out there that will assist the implementation of E-1 that we just did on new generators to interconnect, that will actually have an incentive to work with the marketplace as opposed to be just kind of passive and indifferent and not really facilitate some of the needed improvements we need in infrastructure.

I think the business plan laid out here that
brings in not only some large investor-owned utilities but
some very significant public power assets is really a
template for I think success in other parts of the country,
and I applaud the TransLink applicants for that. I think
that from our visits with investors, certainly they find
what we've already done, which are much more modest
approaches in TransElect and in ITC, I guess that would be
capital ITC, were attractive vehicles. Certainly smaller in
the dollars and scope than what's being contemplated here.
But I think clearly if those are attractive, this would be
that much more so.

So, Linda, I don't fear the impact on investor

1 attitudes as to where we're going. This order and the next

one really do send a good signal, and like you, I'm open to hearing back from people as to what we really need. Because I do think that from my notes on the 19th of February what these folks asked for, where they got kind of clipped back both here and the next order were in areas that didn't seem to me to be that central to the business plan. Anyway, if I'm wrong on that, I will listen and be open.

But I do think that the delegation of functions from the umbrella MISO to the individual ITCs in this order were good. This order also in TransLink points out that we're open to innovative rates and other innovations from ITC. What we did here, as we did with TransElect recently -- I'm not sure what we did on ITC -- we definitely sent a signal that the ratemaking is in a new era as well.

The third thing that I looked for out of my four principles in these couple orders was efficient grid option.

And to use the NERC lexicon when they split up the control area, what we do here is allow the ITC to be the transmission operator, not to be confused with the transmission service provider, which is that one-stop shop operator, but the transmission operator is the person who actively manages the grid assets to maximize throughput, to reduce congestion, to maintain the robust performance of a critical system.

The fourth principle I looked at was the one-stop

1	shop for transmission service. I really felt this was the
2	core of Order 2000. The principle that customers should
3	have access to a one-stop shop over an area of sufficient
4	geographic scope and appropriate configuration to avoid the
5	numerous seams that pop up and inconsistency between
6	postings of ATC between and among the different parts of the
7	region and that is big enough to effectively internalize
8	that hateful loop flow problem that we have learned to love.
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This is what the transmission service provider, in this case, an ISO, would do. Unfortunately, sometimes the one-stop shopping principle here collided with the specific items that the ITC applicants proposed.

As we move forward, Bill, as you point out, towards thinner market design, we need to be very clear about which entity provides transmission service and operates the market, and which entity operates the transmission grid, and make it real clear there's an important role for each, a good business plan on one side, but an important market protection function on the other side.

I do think, particularly on that issue you raised last, if there's a conflict between Trans Link's scheduling between the source and sink in its area, and MISO's scheduling between the source and a sink in the Trans Link area, how that should be resolved. I do think that has to be resolved by one person, not by a committee, and I think this Order makes it clear, who is in charge there, I think, on day one.

However, as MISO, large as it is, is getting up and operational on both the operational control sharing and on the planning issues, they're going to need to delegate some of that out when we get to day two in MISO. I think it

1 will look different on operational control.

T do, like you, Bill, kille of expect to be
following that through as we go through this. I agree,
Linda, that I think what we have not done here is say
anything anything negative on transcos. I think, in fact,
that I would like to say that whoever is the transmission
provider, in whatever business model they have, let's be of
sufficient scope and configuration to eliminate all the
problems that we've seen in the smaller areas.

I do like you Bill kind of expect to be

As long as they do that, I'm pretty open to the type of structure that it has on the top. I'm not as concerned on the planning side, Bill, that a transmission owner has such incentivized hands that it would be the wrong thing.

I just think transmission is so hard, enough to build on its own merits, that even if there were somebody's hands tipping the scales, it still wouldn't make a difference. You've got to build transmission that really wants to be built, and a lot of probably good transmission won't get built anyway.

So I don't mind that transmission might have a little bit more vocal cheerleader in the planning stage than some of the other alternatives, because I think there are plenty of people out there pushing for generation. I don't think there are enough people out there pushing for a

1 rational demand response, but I think we approved an Order

1	today let me make sure we did; yes, we did that
2	certainly moves PJM in an area where some demand response is
3	being incentivized.
4	That, to me, is not a real high-level worry for
5	me today, so I thought Trans Link put forward a good deal.
6	I was pleased that when before they filed that application,
7	they came in here and really delivered pretty much on what
8	they promised they wanted to do.
9	I think we more than met them halfway, and I
10	think that pulling back where it was necessary to ensure
11	that the one-stop shopping concept that Order 2000 laid out
12	as a goal for this Commission was really adhered to. So I
13	congratulate the applicants on their successful application,
14	and thank the team here.
15	I know the team on the back bench here has done a
16	lot with these Orders over the past several weeks, and I
17	appreciate that they were able to move forward on this
18	important part of the agenda, so thank you all.
19	COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: Aye.
20	COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: Aye.
21	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: Aye.
22	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Aye.
23	SECRETARY SALAS: The next item on the agenda, as
24	has been previously noted, is E-5, Alliance Companies and

1 Others, with a presentation by Melissa Lord, Gilda

1	Rodriguez, Michael Donnini, Patrick Clearey, and Michael
2	McLaughlin.
3	MS. LORD: Good afternoon. I'm Melissa Lord.
4	With me at the table are Gilda Rodriguez, Patrick Clearey,
5	Michael Donnini, and Michael McLaughlin.
6	My presentation involves E-5, and Order on
7	Alliance Companies and National Grid's joint petition for
8	Declaratory Order requesting that the Commission find that
9	certain proposed policy resolutions an appropriate basis for
10	the participation of Alliance Gridco in the Midwest ISO.
11	Under today's Order, National Grid will have the
12	opportunity to profitably own and manage its independent
13	transmission business and to draw on its significant
14	experience and expertise toward the efficient utilization
15	and expansion of the nation's transmission infrastructure.
16	Specifically, today's Order provides guidance in
17	five areas requested by Petitioners: First, consistent with
18	today's Order in Trans Link, this Order details areas and
19	certain functions that may be delegated by the Midwest ISO
20	to Alliance Gridco.
21	Secondly, this Order provides guidance so that
22	the Midwest ISO, in consultation with Alliance Gridco, may
23	determine the maximum use of Alliance Gridco's systems that
24	were developed in good faith.

Further, the Order finds that Petitioners have

1	raised valid concerns regarding potential cost shifts due to
2	the Midwest ISO's existing rate design and revenue
3	distribution methodology.
4	The Order also finds that Petitioners' proposed
5	transitional rate methodology for a short transitional
6	period ending December 31, 2004, provides a reasonable basis
7	for addressing these concerns.
8	Fourth, the Order denies Petitioners' requests
9	that Alliance Gridco pay only for Midwest ISO's incremental
10	cost of providing RTO service to Alliance Gridco. However,
11	the order notes that Midwest ISO's proposal to unbundle its
12	administrative cost data to accommodate Appendix I entities
13	is at issue in an ongoing proceeding, and, therefore, makes
14	the issue of Alliance Gridco's payment of the Midwest ISO's
15	administrative cost adder subject to the outcome of that
16	proceeding.
17	The Order also requires the Midwest ISO to
18	evaluate the Schedule 10 adder applicable to Alliance
19	Gridco, to ensure the appropriate recognition of the cost of
20	any such systems contributed by Alliance Gridco.
21	Fifth, the Order finds that pending further
22	negotiations between the parties, the Midwest ISO's offer on
23	equity considerations to refund the \$60 million under the

Illinois Power settlement, provided that Illinois Companies

1 pay their fair share of the Midwest ISO's startup costs, is

1	reasonable.
2	Finally, based on the guidance provided, the
3	draft Order directs Petitioners to file a compliance filing
4	within 30 days from the date of this Order, detailing which
5	RTO Petitioners plan to join, and whether such participation
6	will be on a collective or an individual basis. This
7	concludes my presentation, thank you.
8	COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: I will be issuing a
9	concurrence today, along with my affirmative vote on this
10	Order. The reason I am voting for this Order today is
11	because we have ruled on Alliance's request for a
12	Declaratory Order, and that will allow the Alliance
13	Companies to finish making their plans.
14	The reason I am concurring is much like the Trans
15	Link Order. I am uneasy about whether the calls we make
16	will allow ITCs such as the one the Alliance Companies wish
17	to form to become viable and vibrant business models.
18	We ordered the Alliance Companies to file a
19	compliance filing within 30 days of the date of this order,
20	detailing which RTO the Alliance Companies plan to join,
21	either collectively or individually, and I hope that the 30
22	days is enough.
23	In addition to requiring the Alliance Companies
24	to apprise us of their intentions for joining a specific RTO

or RTOs, we direct the MISO, in consultation with Alliance

1	Gridco, to file within 60 days, which systems of the
2	Alliance Gridco can be used.
3	There are functions that we make calls on with
4	respect to requests that the Alliance Companies made in
5	their declaratory order, requesting us to do that. A few of
6	them, I think, will be very beneficial to the Alliance
7	Companies in going forward with their plans to form an ITC.
8	Some may not.
9	So, again, I don't want to cast negativity, but I
10	am casting some caution and concern, and, again, the
11	comments that I made in the Trans Link Order apply to this
12	one, as well, and I will be the first to dance a jig if I am
13	wrong. I hope I am.
14	COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: I hope today's Order
15	provides the clarity that the participants have asked for,
16	so that, in fact, they can move on make business plans.
17	This has been a long, difficult, arduous process for
18	everyone, and I think has created some uncertainty that I
19	hope is dispelled by the decisions made today.
20	I think that the Order goes a long way towards
21	addressing the mutual concerns of the parties and some very
22	specific concerns, and, I think, contributions that Alliance
23	made in their recommendations, particularly in terms of the

transitional rate proposal.

We can't work magic. We can provide leadership

and clarity, and I hope the participants themselves can make the magic happen, because I think those individual companies are well poised to make some decisions that, whichever way they go, are good for the larger markets, and those decisions need to be done on the systems issue. I just hope that we all take a very careful look at how the decisions get made.

I suspect that there are other uses that can be made to these systems, should people pursue different business models. I don't want to be quick to say these investments are now worth nothing in this new market.

I think we need to be disciplined about how we look at those systems and those system costs. I'm going to be urging Staff to be very actively involved in that process, but, by and large, I think this creates some certainty, creates some clarity, gives people what I believe they need to make their business decisions. But I think the business decisions need to get made.

COMMISSIONER MASSEY: Virtually all of my comments with respect to the Trans Link Order are applicable here, as well, so I won't repeat them. Let me just say, as one who has participated very actively in this whole slice-and-dice debate, that if you take the Trans Link Order and this Alliance Order, I think what you get is the most up-to-

1 date decisionmaking by the Commission with respect to how we

1	would allocate functions within an RTO, between the RTO and
2	the ITCs that are functioning within the RTO, so there is a
3	lot of information, scores of policy calls in these orders.
4	It's not that the slice-and-dice debate is over,
5	but in terms of allocating functions, this is the position
6	of the Commission at this time, and it's laid out in great
7	detail in these two Orders. So I wanted to make that point
8	and commend it to everyone in the marketplace that has an
9	interest in this question of how an ITC will function, what
10	functions will it have within the context of a larger RTO.
11	This Order has my support as well.
12	CHAIRMAN WOOD: And mine. I think that on the
13	slice-and-dice issues, I don't have much new to add than I

said before. Certainly we worked on these Orders together.

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On the rate issues, though, I think it's a very interesting part of the order that I would encourage not just people in the Midwest to read. Certainly Alliance pretty much gets what they advocate with regard to that, but the Order has a lot more to say about this for any other region, and I think the very meaty discussion there about equities of regional rate design are kind of new ground for this Commission, and, I think that in the context of a Declaratory Order, are refreshingly decisive.

So I do appreciate the mindset change that we are

going through on these cost issues, because at the end of

1	the day, I've always found that we can talk about technical
2	and operational things till the cows come home, but
3	decisions really get made when you talk about money, and the
4	money issues are keyed up here.
5	I recognize that the incremental versus
6	unbundling issue, I think got resolved well. That issue,
7	taken together with the \$60 million refund to the exiting
8	parties from Illinois, certainly seems to me to indicate
9	that you certainly pay once for everything, but you don't
10	pay twice, but you can't get by paying nothing, either.
11	It works out pretty well, certainly contingent on
12	a future proceeding, but I have already gone public saying
13	that I'm in favor of unbundling rates. If we are unbundling
14	utilities' rates, we should unbundle ITOs and RTOs rates,
15	too, because it ought to be good for everyone.
16	This, to me, is a critical Order. I'm glad and I
17	appreciate that the Staff got a Declaratory Order of this
18	import turned around and before us in 40 days or so, and I
19	think that's a very good signal that we value very much
20	what's going on in the Midwest, and we want closure there.
21	And I think this document is very crisp,
22	particularly where it needs to be. I liked it, so I'm all
23	for it.

1 thing. I want to thank the Midwest Commissioner who have

1	been really active participants and have provided
2	extraordinary leadership in resolving some of the issues, so
3	we don't find ourselves, as we sometimes do, in a different
4	place than our colleagues in the states.
5	So I just want to give them an 'at a boy, because
6	they have certainly worked hard to make this region a model
7	that I think we can all look to.
8	COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: Aye, with concurrence.
9	COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: Aye.
10	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: Aye.
11	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Aye.
12	SECRETARY SALAS: The next item for discussion
13	this morning is No. E-36, Public Utilities Commission of the
14	State of California and Others, with a presentation by Olga
15	Kolotushkina.
16	MS. KOLOTUSHKINA: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman
17	and Commissioners. The E-36 draft Order addresses
18	complaints filed by the Public Utility Commission of the
19	State of California and the California Electricity Oversight
20	Board against a group of sellers of energy under long-term
21	contracts with the California Department of Water Resources.
22	22
23	These complaints allege that the prices, terms,
24	and conditions of such contracts are unjust and

1 unreasonable, and that the Respondents obtained the prices,

terms and conditions in the contracts through the exercise
of market power. The Complainant seeks the extraordinary
remedy of contract modification.
To assure that the Complainants have a full and
fair opportunity to present their cases, and that the
Commission, in turn, has a complete record on which to base
its decision, the draft Order sets the complaints for an
evidentiary hearing on contracts executed before June 20,
2001. The Complainants will bear the burden of proving that
the contract modification is justified.
The draft Order also notes that this burden is a
heavy one; that the burden of proof for some of the
contracts is the contrary-to-the-public-interest standard,
and that the evidence contained in the complaints alone does
not carry the applicable burden.
Furthermore, to aid the parties in settling their
disputes without the burden and expense of litigation, the
Order holds the hearing in abeyance, pending the outcome of
settlement judge procedures. This concludes my
presentation, thank you.

COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: I just have a very short

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comment to make. I was very pleased to hear about the 3 successful renegotiation between the State of California and five sellers of long-term contracts that was made known to 5 us through the newspapers in California and various trade press articles the last two days. I think that is a good sign of hopefully more to come. The marketplace desperately 8 needs certainty and a long and protracted hearing will not give us that any time soon. So it is my sincere hope that 10 parties will come to the table and renegotiate these contracts as the draft order provides for under the 12 settlement judge procedures. This order wasn't easy for me nor was the one two weeks ago with Nevada Power. But we are 14 making some decisions and moving down the road with respect 15 to these issues which are very serious and I do hope that 16 other parties are able to successfully renegotiate either in 17 California before proceedings start here, or through the 18 settlement judge procedures which this order envisions. 19 Thank you.

> COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: I'll be supporting this order as I did in the Nevada order with concurrence on the MobileSierra standard, which I believe applies, and I'm glad to see at least applies in some of these contracts. I add to Linda's comment that I hope that the parties can come to

1 some settlement before this has to go to hearing. We had

several weeks ago, maybe a month ago, a presentation on infrastructure investment in California which we saw has come almost to a standstill. The feedback we get from those who would provide the financing for further infrastructure additions is that with the kind of uncertainty on these issues and a number of issues within the State of California itself, that that financing is not going to be readily available.

There's a huge cost to that lack of infrastructure financing and I don't want to find ourselves in the same situation again. I just say once again I have a strong sense of urgency as I have a strong sense of commitment to a very high burden of proof that would cause us to abrogate a contract. I think we take that very seriously and we need to say that again and again.

COMMISSIONER MASSEY: I agree with setting these contracts for hearing. I think the Commission needs to give them a good hard look. I agree with much of this order. In most respects this order follows the language of the order that we voted out on the last agenda dealing with the so-called Nevada contracts. So those of you who read this order will see virtually the same language in many, many respects here as well. So I agree with much of this order.

We're doing the right thing in setting these contracts for

1 hearing.

I disagree with the order's conclusion that the complainants have not shown that the dysfunctional spot market had an adverse effect on the long term contract market. I think they have shown that fairly persuasively.

It seems obvious to me that the soaring prices in the spot market had a rather dramatic effect on both the negotiations and the contracts that were ultimately negotiated. Why would someone agree to \$250 an hour power unless they were dealing with a spot market in which the price was \$250, \$270, \$430 per hour? Yes, they bear a heavy burden. That is our case law and we respect that here.

But the Federal Power Act says that any contract that is not just and reasonable is flatly unlawful. We simply aren't doing our jobs and aren't carrying out our Federal Power Act responsibilities if we rubber stamp contracts just because they are long-term contracts. That's not what the Act says. Any uncertainty in the market arising from the fact that we are looking at these contracts is created by the terms of the Federal Power Act itself, so there's a lot in this order that I like. There are some provisions, there's some language that I would not have included and that I disagree with. And there is a conclusion in this order that I must dissent from because I think it is wrong. The order concludes that the California

Public Utilities Commission, which is not a party to any of

these contracts, is bound by the MobileSierra language of
 the contracts.

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In other words, the California Public Utility Commission is bound to a higher burden of proof, the public interest standard rather than the just and reasonable standard of the contracts. The argument seems to be that, I guess, the entire California State Government somehow functions as a monolith making joint decisions on these issues. Thus a clause in the contract signed by the Department of Water Resources somehow binds the California Public Utilities Commission. Such a conclusion is unprecedented in my judgment. The California PUC points out that it did not participate in the negotiations leading to the signing of these contracts. It's an independent regulatory body responsible for regulating utilities and is charged with protecting consumers. It is, in some ways, similar to the FERC. This Commission would bristle at the idea that some executive branch official or the Department of the Interior or the Department of Energy or you name the other agency, could somehow bind us in some way that is inconsistent with our statutory responsibility. I think that would be unprecedented and wrong.

Are hundreds of other California State entities and agencies also bound? Is any creature or institution of

the California State Government bound by clauses in the DWR

contract even if they had nothing to do with their negotiations? I think not. We don't cite any precedent for this conclusion that the California PUC is bound and I don't think any such precedent exists. In fact our precedents, in my view, lead in the opposite direction. They generally support the position that a signatory to a contract cannot bind non-parties to a certain standard of review. So I respectfully dissent on this point, Mr. Chairman, and will be writing separately.

CHAIRMAN WOOD: Thank you, Bill. I think to follow up on the point you made a moment ago, I know that there are some out there who are concerned about our referral of this and of all the cases to hearing. I think, as this order and that one have laid out though, the law compels it, and I think this is the opportunity that parties can first of all use to negotiate. Fortunately some already have. I notice that our most current draft of this order has deleted five contracts from Appendix A that make this order a little bit lighter, but I think it's the case it's time to make the case on both sides why this shouldn't happen. Get it out there, air it in public, then put this issue to bed. There either is something wrong or there wasn't something wrong. Let's just get it over with because it's not benefitting anybody, and I think the amount of time

1 it takes to put on a sufficient case is relatively short

compared to the amount of time it would take to get rid of venom that just stays in the system and is never eliminated.

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If these are not settled, we will ultimately come up with decisions not with very much clarity, not in 1935 when the Act was written but 2001, 2002, 2003, when the new world is coming into full impact, what the Federal Power Act means. If we don't have a hundred percent settlements here, we will be able to articulate very clearly and provide a tremendous amount of certainty for long-term contracting and how that interplays with the Federal Power Act. So I think either way at the end of this relatively short progression on the California, Nevada, and I think other states as well, cases that there will be a lot of certainty in this market. I know some people wish it wouldn't have been uncertain in the first place. But the place to fix that is down the street when you write the Federal Power Act over, not here.

As to the issue you raise, Bill, I do understand what you're saying. I think though that the standing in shoes, the state, much like any corporate parent, has affiliates and I think if it were always able to in fact take a MobileSierra standard that was negotiated between one branch of the state and a seller and then allow basically another branch of state government to come around that and circumvent that I think that would really crater the

1 opportunity for anybody to have faith that a deal with the

state is going to stick. I do know there's already enough concern about that today with what's going on out there today that I don't want to add that by saying that we basically countenance a bypass of what two parties have agreed to. The party that had the imprimatur of the state to be negotiating on behalf of its customers in the first place, so if the state wants to change the way that BWR works and what it can agree to I think it's for them to deal with. But I don't want to create basically an end run around an affiliate.

It is new, I agree, because we haven't been faced with that issue, but I would say if the federal government wanted to do that to us, then if they gave the Department of Defense the right to do something, that more specific, we might be precluded from that. I'm not sure that it's our job to question what legislative enactment allows for so I'm comfortable with the call here. Some have argued that in this order, we shouldn't have allowed the state agencies to have any standing to file these complaints in the first place. I don't think that's fair. I think they do under years and years of FCC an FERC precedent have a right to file these complaints here but I do think that it is appropriate to discuss, as we have tried to do here a little bit better than we did in the Nevada order, what the

1 standard of review ought to be. I think this is timely and

1	I appreciate that. We aren't quite all there on it, but I
2	do think it's important to get these out to hearing and more
3	importantly to a settlement forum where more of the same
4	that happened on Monday can happen again, so let's get
5	there.
6	COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: Aye.
7	COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: Aye with concurring
8	statement.
9	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: No in part.
10	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Aye.
11	SECRETARY SALAS: The next item on the discussion
12	agenda is H-4. This is a report on delegated actions by the
13	Commission's Office of Energy Projects. We have a
14	presentation by Bill Zollar and Barbara Christin.
15	MR. ZOLAR: Good afternoon, Chairman Wood,
16	Commissioners. My name is Bill Zolar with the Office of
17	Energy Projects. To my right is Barbara Christin from the
18	Office of General Counsel.
19	(Slide.)
20	We thought it would be of interest to present you
21	a brief snapshot of the many on-going OEP actions which are
22	really in addition to the more controversial actions that
23	come before the Commission. These actions are not always
24	highly visible. They're not always of large magnitude.

1 However, they are very significant to the applicants and the

1	parties involved. And they represent an important nuts and
2	bolts element of the Commission's work to maintain and
3	advance the nation's energy infrastructure. This briefing
4	this afternoon summarizes the OEP actions for the period
5	just since January 1st of this year. Next slide, please.
6	(Slide.)
7	As you can see, there were over 800 OEP actions
8	during this period. Of the over 800 actions, a number are
9	particularly noteworthy. In the hydro power area there were
10	seven new licenses issued and four major amendments to
11	licenses. There were also 22 preliminary permits to study
12	site feasibility for hydro power projects.
13	For gas, there were two authorizations for
14	construction. It says abandonment too in this case. They
15	were juts for construction under blanket certificate
16	authorizations and there were also six case-specific gas
17	pipeline certificates issued during the period. Next slide,
18	please.
19	(Slide.)
20	It doesn't show up very well but just so you
21	don't strain your eyes, basically this shows the location of
22	the noteworthy actions with the exception of the preliminary
23	permits. The blue dots represent hydro power projects. The

red dots represent natural gas projects. Basically what

1 that map shows is that both the hydro power and the gas

1	projects are pretty evenly distributed throughout the United
2	States. Three of the seven hydro licenses, for instance,
3	are located in Michigan while the other four are in
4	Wisconsin, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and South
5	Carolina.
6	Two of the four hydro power amendments are in
7	California and the other two are fairly widely spread in
8	Idaho and New York.
9	As to gas, the six projects authorized under case
10	specific certificates again are widely distributed. They
11	are located in Texas, Arizona, California, Nevada and
12	Pennsylvania. The two projects authorized under blanket
13	certificates are in Illinois and Maryland. The map doesn't
14	show the location of the preliminary permits hydro permits
15	which are really permits to study the feasibility of hydro
16	power projects, rather than adding to or maintaining
17	existing generation. However, most of those preliminary
18	permits that were issued are located in the west. Next
19	slide, please.
20	(Slide.)
21	So what was authorized in these actions and what
22	was achieved? The seven hydro power licenses maintain 298
23	megawatts of existing capacity, restored flows to over

three-and-a-half miles of dewatered river, enhanced over 75

1 miles of river including two scenic waterfalls and protected

over 4,000 acres of wildlife habitat. The four hydro power license amendments approved .7 megawatts of additional capacity, provided rip rap, sluice boxes and other sediment control measures to reduce annual sediment removal cost, removed a portion of the transmission lines no longer considered primary from the license, and restored natural tributary flows by removing a diversion structure. Next slide, please.

(Slide.)

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The 22 preliminary permit orders approved feasibility studies for 465 megawatts of potential new hydro power capacity. The second bullet there collectively the gas certificates approved about 4.3 miles of new pipeline, added 218 Mmcf per day of capacity for Western State. It says customers, it's really one customer, added six new compressor units totaling 25,600 horsepower and a power plant lateral. The blanket certificate actions approved 1200 Mmcf of additional storage capacity and two new delivery points. What will the new gas facilities do in practical terms? One pipeline segment will permit gas deliveries to a new 1200 megawatt power plant in the rapidly growing Las Vegas, Nevada area. The three compression projects will permit two pipeline companies to comply with Clean Air Act requirements and the other company to replace 1 a deteriorating pipeline segment.

1	The new delivery points will provide for more
2	flexible gas delivery opportunities into the Southern
3	California market as well as an alternative source of gas
4	for an existing Baltimore area manufacturing plant.
5	Finally, the authorization of new storage capacity will
6	provide enhanced and more reliable storage to existing
7	pipeline customers of a natural gas pipeline in the Midwest.
8	Together, the gas and hydro actions help sustain
9	and support an adequate energy infrastructure, and they
10	represent the behind-the-scenes, day-to-day activities which
11	are ongoing and are very important to our overall mission.
12	This concludes my presentation. Thank you.
13	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Thank you, Bob and Barbara. I
14	wanted us to just periodically do this, because there are a
15	lot of things particularly in OEP that go through under
16	blanket or delegated authority, and I think it's important
17	for us to put some public spotlight on those. I appreciate
18	the effort and don't have any questions.
19	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: I remember when I first
20	came to the Commission looking at a number of orders that
21	were on the agenda for the full Commission, 100 or 150 every
22	two weeks, and thinking, well, that's a couple of thousand
23	orders a year or perhaps more. But I was told that the
24	Commission, through the full Commission and Staff actually

1 issues 15 to 20 thousand orders a year. Is that roughly

1	right, do you know?
2	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Last week I know you had hov
3	many issuances? Let me ask Magalie. It's one of her new
4	duties here to find out how much of that goes on. What
5	number of issuances from the Commission last week?
6	SECRETARY SALAS: Last week it was like around
7	400 something for one week.
8	CHAIRMAN WOOD: So times 50 weeks, that would be
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10	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: Twenty thousand.
11	MR. ROBINSON: We do about 3,000 actions out of
12	OEP a year, to give you some feel for what comes out of our
13	office.
14	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: I'm glad to have this
15	presentation, because I think it highlights all the behind-
16	the-scenes work that is actually carried out by our great
17	Staff, and it's literally the bulk of the work that the
18	Commission does it seems to me is done. Certainly the
19	overwhelming majority of the orders the Commission issues
20	are carried out at the Staff level by delegation.
21	So there's a lot of day-to-day judgments, 400
22	last week. That's a remarkable number.
23	MR. ZOLLAR: I think it's a good process because
24	those of us that have been here a while remember back in the

late '70s so many of these very routine actions and more

1	major actions had to come to the Commission. I recall
2	Commission meetings being three days sometimes. That's a
3	benefit for you too.
4	(Laughter.)
5	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Say that about every three or
6	four months so I don't get any hazing. Thank you all. Keep
7	up the good work.
8	SECRETARY SALAS: The next item is C-1, Northwest
9	Pipeline Corporation, with a presentation by Lori Tsang,
10	Jack Donaho and John Wisniewski.
11	MS. TSANG: Good afternoon, Chairman Wood and
12	Commissioners. C-1 addresses an application filed by
13	Northwest Pipeline to construct and operate new natural gas
14	lateral pipeline facilities. The facilities consist of two
15	taps on its mainline facilities, 48.9 miles of 20-inch
16	diameter lateral pipeline, a 4,700 horsepower compressor,
17	and a meter station.
18	The new \$75.2 million lateral pipeline will
19	deliver up to 161,500 DTH of natural gas per day to fuel
20	Duke Energy Grays Harbor's new 650 megawatt electric power
21	generating plant that is currently under construction in
22	Grays Harbor County in the state of Washington. The draft
23	order issues a certificate subject to certain conditions
24	designed to protect the environment. It confirms the

1 Commission's preliminary determination that the proposal

1	will provide substantial public benefits with minimal
2	adverse impact.
3	The new Grays Harbor electric generating plant
4	will require test gas this winter and is scheduled to
5	commence commercial operation in July of 2003. Electricity
6	generated by the plant will be sufficient to supply the
7	needs of 600,000 homes and will serve growing markets in the
8	Pacific Northwest and California.
9	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Thank you, Lori. I wanted to
10	call these two up. I just think in general when we're
11	issuing certificates, those are significant items, and I
12	just wanted to have those be just laid out by the Staff who
13	worked on them, just to get some public attention to them.
14	I of course support the order and am glad to see it up here
15	and don't have any further comments on it.
16	All right. Linda, vote?
17	COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: Aye.
18	COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: Aye.
19	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: Aye.
20	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Aye.
21	SECRETARY SALAS: The next item, C-3, Kern River
22	Gas Transmission Company with a presentation by Albert
23	Francese and Randy Mathura.
24	MR. FRANCESE: Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, good

1 afternoon. C-3 addresses an application under Section 7 of

1	the Natural Gas Act filed by Kern River Gas Transmission
2	Company to construct and operate the High Desert Lateral.
3	This 32-mile-long lateral would transport natural gas to a
4	720 megawatt electric power generation plant under
5	construction in the vicinity of Victorville, California.
6	Kern River will transport natural gas to the
7	generator over a 21-year service agreement at negotiated
8	rates. Kern River states that it must start construction in
9	May of this year to meet the generator's requirements. The
10	draft order issues a certificate. Subject to certain
11	environmental conditions and other conditions, the draft
12	order also states that the High Desert Lateral is in the
13	public interest because it will increase the supply of
14	electricity in California with minimal adverse effect.
15	Thank you.
16	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Thank you, Al. Ready to let her
17	go?
18	COMMISSIONER BREATHITT: Aye.
19	COMMISSIONER BROWNELL: Aye.
20	COMMISSIONER MASSEY: Aye.
21	CHAIRMAN WOOD: Aye. I have one administrative
22	item, and that is now, armed with the numbers from our
23	capable Secretary and her staff.
24	SECRETARY SALAS: Next time, Mr. Chairman, I'll

1 ask let's do this one first so that you can send a message.

But, Mr. Chairman asked the Office of the Secretary to
provide today just a snapshot of last week's electronic
filing activities. Just for last week only, and this will
address the days of April 15th through April 19th, we had a
total of 462 filings, out of which 371 were on paper.

Now we are talking here in terms we all know that electronic filing activity has been rolling out into the Commission, and at this point we are allowing electronic filing in basically three categories. We're talking about interventions, comments and protests and pleadings and motions. Interventions, for example, we had 43 filed electronically out of a total of 187. Comments and protests, we had 21 filed electronically out of a total of 153. And in the pleadings and motions category, we had 27 out of a total of 122.

So for last week, we find that if we take a look at these numbers, we have a total rate of 80 percent of the filings that are permissible for which we have provided electronic opportunity, 80 percent of those have come in in paper.

Having said that, I will tell you, Mr. Chairman, that yesterday we hit electronic filing number 6,000. So putting those things into perspective, I think that the future holds great promise for the Electronic Filing

1 Initiative. And as we grow into more categories, we should

1	be seeing an increase.
2	CHAIRMAN WOOD: I would just recommend that one
3	of the things we could to accelerate that would be for maybe
4	you to get me a list of the names of the law firms that like
5	to do paper and I'll have Ms. Alison on her crutch to give
6	them a call.
7	(Laughter.)
8	SECRETARY SALAS: We'll try to do that for you.
9	CHAIRMAN WOOD: We love electronic things.
10	Today's meeting was about a number of things, but certainly
11	harnessing new technology to make life easier on all of us
12	and cheaper for the customer is a big message. We got it
13	internally, too.
14	Thank you all very much. And I promise the next
15	one will not only be three weeks away, but it will be much
16	shorter. Meeting adjourned.
17	(Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m. on Wednesday, April 24,
18	2002, the meeting was adjourned.)
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